whieh hav(~ appended reservations Lo wiLIHlraw Lll!:m. The SecreLary General reqll("~t(:tI thaL "sp,'cial elllphasi~ be plat'(,d on the dissemination of tht' eonv(mLions Lo miliLary p,:rsonnd at all "wI,ls of 'IIIthority, and on th(' instn\('-Lions of sueh pl'rsons as 10 tilt: pri'H'il'l,:s of till: Convl!ntion and on their application." TIll' obsl:rvation wns madl~ thnt both juridical and military expl!rLs are 1\('I:dl:<I to sLudy this subjeeL "~o as to m:hiev(!, undl'r tlIC: eondiLions of JIII)(lerll warfar('. an ",11:qualt' ('OJnprd\('n~ion of LIII' "full rang.: of tet'hnieal anel Il'gal problems. " 'I'll!: Seert'lary r: eneral makes no sp('cifh: plea for a convention regulating nir warf,tn:, but he does seem to indiel "mas~iv(: air IJOmbing" by noting: Ihat, in sonl(! eases, Lhis Lype of warfare has contribuLed to a very broad inll:rpn:ta~ tion of wh~t \ constitutes a permissible miliLary obj('dive. lIe staLes LhaL strategic bombing has, in insLances, been lI~ed for intimidating, demoralir.ing, nnd tl:rrorh~in/!; l'ivilians "by in nieting: indiseriminatl' tll'struetion u(lon d,'nsl'ly poplllatt,d an'as." In IIII' n'plil's to thl' r!'fHlrl, only Finland has ;I'l,t'ifil'ally ,ulVl'rll'd 10 tht' nl'l'd for a ('odifit'alilln of the law~ of air warfare.
'J'hi~ re~olution was the resulL of a IINESCO-(:oll\'I:lwd Confl:n'nel! on IIlImall l{j{!ht~ ill 'I'd,,:rall ill April of I%B.3 Then:, He~oluLion XXIII was ,1I)opll'd by till: Conferen(!(: with only on(' ahslenLion and no votes against it. (Ht:fI:rn:tI to bdow as the 'J'I,lternn ))(:daraLion.) IL was couched in stronger tl:rms than later used in U.N. H(!solulion 244'~, rderrinp; Lo LII!: widespread vioh'll(:l: and brutaliLy of our time~, indueling "massat'n:s, sumnwry 1''\ ('eutions, lorlun's, inhuman In'atml'nt of prisOIlI'rs, killing of l'i\'ilians in anIH'l1 (!onflil'ls anel the Us(: of dll:mieal and biologit'al nwans of wnrfnre indueling napalm bombing." \\,ilh IIII' ha('J..gw\II1I1 of II.N. i{l'slllution ;l·I·I·I· anti tIll' T .. lwran i>l't'laration, II\(' ICRC tleeitletl to expand ils seope of 281 sLudies Lo incluelt' consideration of the laws of war as thcy apply to thc regulation of the eonducL of hosLilities.
A ('omll1iUee of experLs of the 1CRC convened in February 19(>9 and formulated a n'port entitled "ReaffirmaLion and D,:vdopment of the Laws :\IId Customs Applicable in Armed Conf1it:ls.,>4 It was the cuhninaLion of Lheir observations made during the lasL 20 years of p(!rennial armco conflicts, esp,!t:ially in Korea, the Middle East, and \'il'lnam :In" the Y 1'1I1l'1I. As a reslllL of this, the Hed Cross believed it necessary to eon sider the means of combat and LI\I: relation beLween combaLants Lhcmselves.
The inereaseo emphasis givcn to the rl'l!ulalion of armed conllit:! by [he lCRC and the U.N. General Assembly makes iL all the more necessary for air plalllH:rs and flyers to know lheir rights and dULies under the laws of war.
Tlu:re is no dearLh of opinion Lhal in the maLLer of air warfare there are, in faeL, no posiLive rules, Air Marshal Harris, tht: famolls chief of the British BomIH'r Command in \V mid \V ar II, \Holl' ~horlly aftt'r ill' ('OIlt'III::ion Ihat "In thl' malil'l' of Ihl' 11::(' of ain:raft ill war, there is, iL so happens, 110 international law at all."5 This ,·iew has hcen ('I'ItOI:" in ilIon: rel:I:llt limes hy wdlknown illlcl'llation:ll lawy,:rs who h:lve speeialir.e" in studies on tIll! laws of war. U) n no s(!nse hut a rhetorical one," wrote Professor Stone in 1955, "can there still be said to have emerged a body of inLelligible rules of air warfarc eomparahle Lo the traditional rules of land and sea warfare.,,6 Professor Levie laheled the lIonexistence of a code l!lwl'rIIing tIll' lise of airpowl'r in .. rmed l'oltllil'l onl' of thl' major inadl'qnaeil's in Ih(' l'xisting laWl; of war.7 Whill' the view of Air I\larshal Harris refleeLs a eerLain hopele::s aLtitnde toward any alll'lII(1t 10 n:l!lIlal(' IIti:; imporlant forlll of warfare, the views of I'rofe:;:;or:; Ston(: and ).('vie eontain (Ileal' 10 foens I'('fort on its n'gulalion and darifieation.
TllI're are ollly two proVIsions of existillg international legi~lation which wen~ draft~:d with the regulation of air warfan~ specifically ill milld. One was the J 1)07 Hague Declaration prohibiting the dischargl: of projectiles and explosives from balloons "or by other new methods of a similar nature." I twas lI(:VI~r ratified by major powcrs. With the introduction of the aircraft into World War I, with its capacity for guided f1i/!ht, the declaration became an open nullity.
The other provision of convl'ntional law specific'llly framed to regulate air warfare is article 25 of the L 1)07 Hague Convention respecting the laws anrl customs of war on land (H.C. IV). Thatarticle provided that "The allaek of bombardment, by whatever mean,~, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which arc undefende,D is prohibited."
The negotiating record t<hows that the words "by whatever means" were inserted specifically to regulate bombing allacks by air. It has been frequently referred to a~ a basis for seeking to limit the air operalion:; of LH"lIil!c'f!'nt:; and for protestillg Ilw dc~darl'd illc'l!al air activily of an l'nemy. However, IIIl1lc'-Cc~nded cities, in the hislorie senSI~, meant only those in Ihe immediak YoOlW of ground operalioll:; whieh I:ollid IIf" t<l'ized and ol"('upic'd by adv;lIl1:illg groulld Coree:; without the USI: of Coree.
In this 8en8e tlte concept oC the undefended locality has proven as empty in air combat as thc balloon declaration. These two provisions so ullcrly igllored in the usc of airpowcr by belligerents arc the total sum oC formal rules agreed to by any stales on Ihe conduct of Itostilitic's from the air;:paee.
One official and ambitious alll'mpt was mL\{h~ 10 completdy codify the laws oC air warfare after World War I. At the Wa"hillgton ConCI'r!'I\('l' Oil the I.imilation of :\"'II;\mc'lIl" ill I II~ I. a rc':,olulioll wa" \Il1allimou:,ly :1\,pr,)\, .. 11 h~ 11\l' Ullilc,lI ~Iall':;. Ihl' Ulliled Killgdlim, I·'ralll'e. Ilaly, ;uIII Japan whieh ('alll'd for a eommlSSIOl1 of juri:;l:; 10 C:Ollve'lll: at The Ilaglw to study the: SII hjl:cl. Legal experts Crolll tltmw eonlltries :mel the Netherland:; met thl're from December 11)22 to February 11)2:1 and framed an all-emhraeing eodification of the suhjecL intended to he a eompromisl! hetween the necessities of war and the requircmcnts of the standards of civili1.ation. 8 Their rules were never ratified, even by the parties to the Conferenee, hilL do rdb:t the only allthoritative: altl!mptto l"et down completely the air warfare: rules. tl\(: dvilian population should 1101 1m the objl:et of allat:k as .~llch. Are I:i\·ili-ans the direct obj(!el of <ILLa(:k when vital industrial and strategic targ<:ts are in. the immcdiate vicinity, and how much bombing transfers civilians from the indirect-object category to a directobject one'? The lal<: Professor Coopl:r, in a lecture to the Naval \V ar Colle~c in 1948, tcrmed the definition of the military objectivc and the bombing of the civilian population the most erueial issue confronting auy attempt to reg~J late this subject. The Sel'relary (;elll'ral docs recomml'llIl an alternative to arriving at an al'I'I'ptahl!' :11\(1 a~n"',I-upol\ ddinition of thl! milit:lry objl'l,tiw. 10 This would bl! :111 enlargemeut of the concept of safety or protected zones to 283 include specified areas where womcn, children, elderly, and sick could be loeatcd with immullity from air attack. Sueh areas would contain no objectives of military significance nor be used for any military purpose. Thcy would have to be spceially and clearly marked to be visible from the air. To be effective there would have to be an adequate system of control and verjfication of these zones. This verification would be carried out either by some independent agency, such as the ICRC, or by one or more nonbelligerent nations acting in the capacity of a proteeting power. There is ample preeedent for tl\(: en:ation of such protected areas in the 1949 C elleva H ulllan itarian ism Conven Lions for the protel'lion and lrt:almcnt of prisoners of war, civilians, and the sick and wounded. The Sick and Wounded and the Civilian Conventions contain as annexes, draft agreements hopefully to be signed by potential belligerents before the outbreak of hostilities. I 1 These agreements would provide for the establishment of hospital and safety zones. Such zones, under the (~eneva ConvenLions, are Lo eomprise olily a small part of the bdligenmL's terri Lory , l)(: Lhinly populaled, and be rcmoved and free frolll all military objectives or large illllw;(rial 01' :ululinistralivl' I'slahlishnll:nt5. 'I'III'Y lIIay not be ddl~IIII(,11 hy mililary means (whieh presumably indudes the dcfcnsl: by antiairerafL weurons, lactical fighter aircraft, or guided weapons). Such a conccpt of protccted zoncs, but incorporating a brouder catcgory of til<: c.ivili:1II population lo he !'III'lll'n:d, is an a\tI'rnatiVI: 10 1111' eoncept of the undefended town or the opcn city which has 1I0t found favor in aclual practice. Therc arc some who do 1I0t bcliev(! thc eslablishmcnt of safely zoncs for polenlially large !'l'p;mellts of lhl' l'ivilian population is pradieabll'. To lH' "ITI'din' it is thou~lrt thl'N' ZOIIl'S would require 11lllusatll!s of square milt,s whieh would l'n'ute insurmountable logistics problems and incvitably cause the areas to he used unlawfully for military advantages. 1 2 Perhaps, however, the immuni;r.ed areas'need not be so broad. If one grants that the industrial work foree, those actively engagcd in work directly sustaining the war effort of the belligerent, really have no entitlement to immunity, the physical breadth of the protected areas could be reduced. Such zones arc an alternative to the continually frustrating efforts to pin down the elusive scope of the military objective. The Hague Commission of Jurists' definition of the military objective is a case in point. Military forces; military works; military establishments or depots; factories engaged in the manu facture of arms, ammunition, or disLinctively military supplies; lines of communication or transportation used for military purposes, only, could be bombed from the air. 13 This was hardly broad enough to cover the enemy's marshaling ya'rds, his indusLrial centers, his shipping facilities, and his means of communieaLion. Moreover, cities, towns, and villages noL in the immediate neighborhood of ground operation were prohibited under the Hague Rules. This proved too limited where cities and towns, far remove,1 from the ground action, were known Lo b,: viLal Lo the enemy's war dfol'l. In the same way the extension of hospital zoncs is the start for increm;ing till! areas for the proledion of civilians. Cerlainly the ,:nlargemf:nt of safdy zones for property and people is compatible with area as well as precision bombing techniqucs. Neither concepl requires the destruction of identified protected areas placed at an adequate distanee from large industrial eenters and I:ssential military targets. This is not to suggest that all faeililies and categories of the civilian population outside proteeLed areas would bc within the domain of legitimate air aLLaek. They would not enjoy, however, the same absolute immunily conferred within thc immunized ZOIlf'S. Although not subjeet to direet aLLaek outsidc established sanetuaries, their proximity to assigned military targets would expose them to injury and sllfrering whieh could not thereby be aseribed as indiscriminate or UJan/on. Thc doctrine of proportionalily would, of Gourse, dictate in any I:vcnt that the military advantage to be gaincd by the air aLLack must not be outweighed by the harlll done to civilians and nonessential property. However, this doctrine itself seelllS lo leave a wiele margin for the discretion of the aLLacking force.
The second dilelllma inhibitin~ the development of the laws of air warfan: centers around the dlOiee of weapons which lIIay he employed. The historic The third dilcmma conecrns Lhe stutus of the air<:rcwman. Here is a problem of the enforcement of clearly dcfined rules raLher thull the devclopment of new onl:s. The fallen airman poses problems of growing conccrn as he seems to be singled ouL for mistrcatment or unauLhorized public display with increasing frequcncy. Both the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 rc$pccLin/! land warfare contained provif;ions that memhers of till! armed [Of!"I'S were entitled to til' trl'all~d :If; pri~onl'r~ of war. Of eOllrs(~. this indudl:d allmelllhl'rs.
" I Earl\' in World War I there was .. S0l11e questio"n as to the enemy air~6~ 's", :;tatus, but no euse appeared' in wlll'cll~.:
they were denied 'prisoner-of-war status.
In World War II, however, the concept began to be advanced by some that airmen, unlike their brothers in arms on land and at sea, were not necessarily entitled to be humanely treated. In 1943 Himmler ordered all senior SS and police officers not to interfere bctwel!n German civilians and English and United States flyers who baled out of their aircraft. In 1944 Hitler ordered Allied airerews shot without trial whenever such aircrews had attacked German pilots or airerews in distress, allaeked railway trains, or strafed individual civilians or vehicles. Goebbcls referred to Allied airmen as murderers and stated it was "hardly possible and tolerahle to use German police and soldiers against the German people when the people treat murdere1s of children as they deserve. ,, 29 Although captured Allied airmen were largely accord cd prisoner-of-war status hy German authorities, there is enough evidence of mistreatment in the reports of the major and minor war criminals in Europe to r('11('et the ll('-ginnings of what could he a disturhinp: precedl!nl. In tlw Far East, Allied airmen also suffered fro/ll deprivation of their prisolwr-of-war statlls. Two of tIll! U.S. ain:n:ws wllidl participated ill till' famous Doolittle air raids on Tokvo and Nagoya from thl! U.S. naval 'earrier lIomel WI!re eaptllrcd by J aparll$l: troops when they made forced landings in mainland China. At the tillle of their capture there was no Japanese law under which they could be punished. This was remedied 4 months after their enpture by thc passage of the Enemy Airmen's Act of Japan. This act made it a war crime to participate in nn air attack upon civilians, private property, or conduct air operations in violation of the laws of war. Thl' law was m.lIll! rclroadive to ('ov('r thos\' lI.S. airnll'n already in their hands. In October I IH~, 2 months after the passage of the Enemy Airnwllj's Ad, threl! of. the ))00-lillie-rniders wef/! selltl!need nlld executed. The Judgment of the In tern ationnl Tribunal for the Far EnRt reflects mnny instnllccs thereafter where captured Allied nirmen were tortured, deeapitnted, nnd eVl!n dl!liberatcly hurned to death. It WilS the unanimous opinion of the Secretllry GeJJt!ral and the [CRe experts that even where: airmcn had committed aets which were alleged to be war erimes, they shonld be trellted liS prisoners of war. 3 2 I\lorcover, thilt iln airman behind t:ne:my linl's, in elistn:ss, ilnll not employillg any weapon should be protected fro\ll the civilian population. Ne'itllC'r, howev(!r, gave any significant attention to the relation of war crimes liS ddine:d at Nuremberg and Tokyo to the l'ondueL of air op,:rations. In view of the non prosecution of any Axis airman or o[ficilll for tlll!ir part in air lIetivities, ~trategic homhing, which hy its nalure is hound to cause a great dc'al of su ffering ilnd devastation, must he judged on different grounds. Certainly the imperlIIi":;ihility of the' clt'fl'nt"l: of ~\'1J('rior orcic'r:; ha:; VC'!'), lllll,:;tionahlt, applil'ation to air eomhal. Tlw (!x perts mill tIll! Secretary Lolh raised this issue in lheir report by stating that when the attack of the military ohjl:t:tiv(: will eilu::t: serions loss to the t:iviliiln population .md is disproportionate to the militllry advantage, ain:rc:ws must mfrilin from tIll! allllek. In n:eommending thilt the principles in U.N. Resolu tion 2444 he introduced into army military instruction, cspccilllJy for air forces, the experts also stated this is "to remind all the members of the armed forces that it is sometimes their duty to give priority to the n:quirements of humllnity, placing these hefon! lIny eontrilry orders they mighl rc:ceive.,, 3 
